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OWNERSHIP AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR IN TRANSITION: CASE 
OF CZECH COOPERATIVE AND CORPORATE FARMS  
ABSTRACT 
Cooperative and corporate farms have retained an important role for agricultural production in 
many  transition  countries  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Despite  this  importance,  their 
ownership structure and particularly the ownership's effect on their investment activity vital 
for efficient restructuring and the sector's future development are still not well understood. 
This paper aims to analyze the ownership-investment relationship using data on Czech farms 
from 1997 to 2008. We allow for ownership-specific variability in farm investment behavior 
analyzed by means of error-correction accelerator model. Empirical results suggest significant 
differences in the level of investment activity, responsiveness to market signals, investment 
lumpiness  of  investment  as  well  as  sensitivity  to  financial  variables  among  farms  with 
different ownership characteristics. Resulting increase in farm performance differences among 
farms can be expected to lead to farm restructuring in direction of lowering number of owners 
and increasing ownership concentration.             
INTRODUCTION 
The diversity of ownership structures that have emerged in agriculture in transition countries 
offer a unique opportunity to study the ownership effect on farm investment activity and thus 
to insinuate future farm structural development. The farm ownership constellations in most of 
the Central and Eastern European countries are assigned by their dual nature, i.e. by a large 
number of small individually or family owned farms and a small number of large-scale farms 
of  a  cooperative  and  corporate  form.  The  large-scale  farm,  despite  their  relatively  low 
numbers,  remained  cultivating  a  considerable  share  of  agricultural  land.  For  example,  in 
Bulgaria  and  in  Romania,  the  share  of  agricultural  land  cultivated  by  cooperative  and 
corporate farms corresponds to nearly 50%, in the Czech Republic to around 70% and in 
Slovakia almost 90% (LERMAN et al., 2004; Ministerstvo zemědělství České Republiky, 2009, 
Ministerstvo Podohospodarstva Slovenskej Republiky, 2008). Despite their dominance in the 
sector, the complex ownership structures and governance of these farms, particularly their 
effect on investment decisions vital for the efficient restructuring and future development of 
the sector, have not received researchers' sufficient attention. 
In comparison to firms with corporate governance in mature economies, the corporate farms' 
governance  in  transition  countries  was  formed  in  conditions  of  weak  legal  protection  of 
renewed property rights as well as minority shareholder interests. As a direct consequence of 
these  conditions,  the  property  rights  reforms  led  to  highly  dispersed  ownership  of  the 
corporate  farms  with  a  great  representation  of  external  as  well  as  insider  (employee  and 
managerial) ownership. The following ownership development has been further cramped by 
only  slowly  emergent  internal  corporate  environment  and  underdeveloped  markets  for 
agricultural  ownership  shares.  This  environment  indicates  high  probability  of  inefficient 
property rights allocation and high agency costs which could be partially lowered by efficient 
management incentive and monitoring mechanisms. The new owners, however, dispose of 
knowledge  with  corporate  bonding  and  control  mechanisms  limited  only  to  their  short 
transitional experience.  Each of these aspects amplifies the  agency problems of corporate 
governance  in  transition  agriculture.  The  separation  of  ownership  and  control  over  the 
corporate  farms  and  underdeveloped  corporate  mechanisms  suggest  that  the  most 
distinguishing characteristics of the corporate governance in transition agriculture is the large 3 
 
scope for managerial discretion. The area in which the scope for managerial discretion comes 
to  its  greatest  effect  is  in  the  generated  internal  funds  distribution  and  decisions  over 
productive investment.  
Most empirical studies of the ownership-investment relationship were conducted for mature 
market economies (see, e.g., MORCK ET AL. 1988; MCCONNELL AND SERVAES, 1990; CHO, 
1998; CHADDAD ET AL., 2005; GUGLER, 2005; DANIELSON AND SCOTT, 2007); only scarcely 
were these studies done for transition countries (MUELLER  AND PEEV, 2007; GUGLER  AND 
PEEV, 2007; DOMADENIK ET AL., 2008; BOKUSHEVA et al., 2009). The empirical results by 
MUELLER  AND  PEEV  (2007)  support  the  existence  of  the  managerial  discretion  effect  on 
investment in more than 10 selected Central and Eastern European countries. They ascribe the 
resulting over-investment to the corporate governance institutions and weak law enforcement 
in  transition  countries.  DOMADENIK  ET  AL.  (2008)  analyzed  the  effect  of  the  relationship 
between  management  and  employed  owners  on  the  Slovenian  firms’  investment.  Their 
hypothesis that  managers and employees  bargain over the allocation of generated  internal 
funds between wages and investments and thus decrease funds for fixed investment in less 
liquid  capital  markets  was  not  confirmed  by  the  empirical  data.  In  their  study  of  firms 
investment behavior in 15 transition economies, GUGLER AND PEEV (2007) found a decline in 
the investment sensitivity to cash flow over the period 1993-2003. They attributed this trend 
to the decrease of agency problems as capital markets and corporate governance standards 
developed. BOKUSHEVA et al. (2009) found that Russian farms with higher share of owners 
among managers show a higher and positive relationship between investment and cash flow. 
They interpret this result as related to higher marginal productivity of capital in farms with 
higher  managerial  ownership.  LÍZAL  AND  ŠVEJNAR  (2001)  found  a  positive  relationship 
between investment and profitability in Czech (non-agricultural) cooperatives and to a lesser 
extend  in  small  private  firms  and  attribute  this  observation  to  these  firms  encountering 
financial constraints. In the case of cooperatives, however, this result could indicate not only 
encountering  of  credit  constraints  but  also  decision-making  constraints  related  to  labor-
management and thus the cooperatives’ internal governance.    
With only a few investment studies on transition agriculture, the farm ownership-investment 
relationship in transition countries remains vastly unexplored. This study aims to reduce this 
research  gap  using  unique  survey  data  on  ownership  structure  of  Czech  cooperative  and 
corporate farms
1. This data combined with investment, production and financial data from the 
Farm Accountancy Data Network for the time period 1997-2008 is used in an error-correction 
accelerator model framework.  
OWNERSHIP AND INVESTMENT - THEORETICAL DISCUSSION  
Principal-agent relationship's role in investment modeling 
The  modern  theory  of  firm  investment  behavior  is  built  upon  its  neoclassical  foundation 
formulated  by  MODIGLIANI  AND  MILLER  (1958)  and  JORGENSON  (1963). The  neoclassical 
investment theory considers a world of perfect capital markets and optimal accumulation of 
                                                 
1   The reasons for focusing the study on collective and corporate farms only are manifold. As mentioned above, 
cooperative and corporate farms play an important role in many of the transition countries, while agency 
problems that are characteristic for corporate or joint ownership with delegated management is a likely source 
of non-optimal investment decisions and restructuring. One could argue for the suitability of a comparative 
analysis  between  individual  farms  and  farms  with  joint  ownership. However,  such  a  comparison  would 
introduce an investment effect of heterogeneous financial conditions (credit constraints) between large and 
small individual farms (see, e.g., BEZEMER, 2003), which, without concrete information on these conditions, 
would disturb the interpretation of the results on agency-investment relationship. To the convenience of this 
study, the ownership structure of corporate and cooperative farms is so diverse that this relationship can be 
well analyzed within the sample of these farms purely.  4 
 
capital. It assumes that the short-run investment of a firm represents a lagged response to 
changes in underlying market conditions as well as the tax structure both affecting the cost of 
capital (JORGENSON, 1963). Later literature demonstrated the breakdown of the neoclassical 
investment model by acknowledging the investment role of asymmetric information between 
managers of the firm and the providers of external capital (banks), as well as agency costs 
arising  from the divergent goals of  managers and owners of the  firm (MAIRESSE,  ET  AL., 
1999).  
The issue of information asymmetries, also called adverse selection, refers to a situation when 
managers and other insiders know that their firm offers attractive investment opportunities, 
while potential suppliers of external capital do not dispose of sufficient information to assess 
the investment returns (e.g., STIGLITZ and WEISS, 1981; MYERS and MAJLUF, 1984). As a 
consequence, a firm may depend more on internal resources that are limiting in their amount 
which  results  in  less  optimal  capital  accumulation  (under-investment).  The  second 
phenomenon that shattered the neoclassical fundament of the investment model applies to 
corporate  (joint)  ownership  with  separation  of  ownership  and  control.  Information 
asymmetries between owners and managers, often referred to as moral hazard, give managers 
a scope for discretion that can be utilized for pursuing goals and interests that deviate from the 
goals  and  interest  of  owners  and  thus  lead  to  non-optimal  decisions  from  the  owners 
perspective (JENSEN and MECKLING, 1976). Besides goal differences, also not having their 
personal  wealth  at  stake,  represents  a  reason  for  managers  behaving  less  optimally  than 
owners (given same information and qualification) (JENSEN, 1986; ANG, 1991). Also, seeking 
higher appraisal, manager's generally tend to present their work, and thus firm performance 
and market standing positively, which suggests growth potential leading to over-investment 
(GRABOWSKI AND MUELLER, 1972; MILLER AND PEEV, 2007). However, we can argue that in 
the case of transition, where capital markets are characterized by lower liquidity (DOMADENIK 
ET AL., 2008), and especially in the case of agriculture, which is characterized by significantly 
lower profitability than other sectors as well as  lower attractiveness to banks,  managerial 
discretion could be utilized toward higher investment only if there are alternative accessible 
investment sources (such as operational leasing), but will unlikely lead to over-investment. 
Managerial discretion could rather manifest itself in higher dependency on internal funds and 
decreasing relative productivity of the firm over time.  
The differences in objectives and incentives together with the information asymmetries thus 
increases the importance of overall efficiency of corporate governance, including management 
monitoring.  Nevertheless,  both  losses  in  decision  optimality  or  improving  corporate 
governance  result  in  costs,  agency  costs,  bore  by  corporate  owners.  Their  levels  can  be 
assumed  to  be  particularly  high  in  transition  economies,  where  the  legal  protection  of 
shareholders  (mainly  minority  shareholders)  has  been  weak  and  the  concept  of  active 
governance of firms to shareholders was new.     
As outlined above, the mode in which corporate ownership structure affects investment the 
most is its provision of scope for managerial discretion and its effect on the incentive structure 
that reflects in managerial technical and investment performance. One way in which both 
asymmetric information between the firm and possible suppliers (lenders) of external capital 
and agency problems within the firm impact firm investment is the use of internal versus 
external financial resources. This implies an importance of financial variables (profit or cash 
flow)  in  the  investment  decision.  In  a  perfect  capital  market  or  when  no  information 
asymmetries exist between a firm and a supplier of external finance, a firm should not be 
limited in its investment with high returns by lower internal funds since cost of external and 
internal  finances  equal and external capital  is  fully accessible (FAZZARI  ET  AL., 1988). In 
imperfect capital  markets with  information asymmetries, or with differential cost between 
internal and external finance, a firm investment activity will be more sensitive to generated 5 
 
profit or cash flow (FAZZARI ET AL., 1988). Evidence of excessive sensitivity to cash flow has 
thus  been  often  interpreted  as  suggesting  the  existence  of  credit  constraints.  However, 
KAPLAN AND ZINGALES (1997) argue that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is also 
justified by the fact that external funds are more costly than internal funds for all firms as long 
as some transaction costs are involved. Similarly to POTERBA (1988), they also argue that, 
since current investment depends not only on the current but also on expected future changes 
in the desired stock of capital, it is possible that information on cash flow helps to forecast 
future profitability and investment opportunities, which, again results in higher investment 
sensitivity to cash flow. Nevertheless, most relevantly to our study, the investment sensitivity 
to cash flow as a proxy for internal funds may have a firm internal rationale. As outlined 
above,  management  aiming  at  personal  appraisal  is  motivated  to  present  optimistic  firm 
results  and  follow  a  strategy  of  growth  independent  of  the  real  returns  on  capital  and 
investment.  In  this  case,  management  is  assumed  to  preferably  finance  (less  efficient) 
investment projects  from  internal resources to avoid  the projects' external (bank)  scrutiny 
(JONES ET AL., 2005, MUELLER AND PEEV, 2007). 
Ownership specific investment behavior   
Since both information asymmetries between the firm and suppliers of external capital as well 
as firm internal principal-agent problems should result in a positive investment sensitivity to 
financial variables, the distinction between these two and possibly other sources of investment 
sensitivity to internal funds remains mostly ambiguous. Only a sufficiently detailed empirical 
data underpinning the firm ownership variability investigated within a relevant investment 
model  and  a  comprehensive  theoretical  discussion  can  help  to  shed  more  light  on  the 
determinants of corporate farm
2 investment behavior and filter out the ownership effects.  
The  various  forms of  joint ownership can  be  outlined  by differences  in the degree of 
ownership dispersion (size of ownership shares  and number of owners), imbalances in the 
share sizes among shareholders, or the distribution of ownership between external and internal 
owners. Each of these ownership characteristics impacts differently the joint governance. 
Dispersed ownership represented by small ownership shares distributed among a large number 
of owners may provide insufficient incentives for any one investor to monitor and control the 
performance of the firm, whereas, where there are large dominant shareholders, the returns to 
active governance are greater   (MAYER,  1996).  The  monitoring  functions  are  then  mainly 
delegated to internal or external controllers (e.g., members of the Board of Trustees). For the 
same  reasons  above,  organizations  with  high  ownership  dispersion  lack  a  strong  back-
coupling  between  the  owners  and  controllers.  In  transition  economies  assigned  by 
shareholders' low experience with corporate governance and lacking connection to relevant 
specialists, external controllers were often proposed by managing stuff, mostly from historic 
networks.  Such  constellation  of  management  control  can  be  assumed  less  rigorous  than 
potential  control  performed  by  fully  independent  and  qualified  monitoring  agents. 
Furthermore, the direct monitoring capacities of small shareholders can further be considered 
as  hindered  by  information  asymmetries  between  them  and  managers,  as  well  as  their 
bounded  rationality,  as  ownership  to  agricultural  assets  was  partially  acquired  by  former 
employees in collective farms with technical qualification, low education and entrepreneurial 
knowledge.  The  interplay  of  all  these  factors  related  to  dispersed  ownership  create  an 
environment characterized by a larger scope for managerial discretion allowing the managers 
                                                 
2   Cooperatives are treated in this study as farms with corporate governance, since either the obligation of 
connecting cooperative membership to work in the cooperative nor the one member-one vote voting rule are 
included  in  the  actual  commercial  law  of  the  Czech  Republic  (Law  nr.  513/1991  of  the  Code  of  Law, 
Commercial  Code).  Most  Czech  agricultural  cooperatives  do  not  chose  the  rules  traditionally  defining 
producer cooperatives in academic literature. 6 
 
to pursue their own interests, as well as by conditions for high managerial transaction costs
3 
and lesser incentive for managerial performance.  
Regarding the use of internal versus external sources for investment financing, the less 
efficient governance related to dispersed ownership can lead to the avoidance of external 
scrutiny of investment projects, which is in line with the above presented argument by 
MUELLER  AND  PEEV  (2007).  Lesser  external  monitoring  (e.g.,  by  banks)  then  amplifies 
insufficient monitoring of management in firms with ownership dispersion (DOMADENIK ET 
AL., 2008)
4. As a result of these factors, high ownership dispersion  can be assumed to lead to 
higher investment sensitivity to financial variables  then higher ownership concentration. In 
the conditions of (Czech) transition, however, most dispersed ownership is characteristic for 
farms where restituents' (new owners') property claims were (later in transition) transformed 
into shares as a form of securing a value of the restituted property (see CURTISS et al. 2006). 
For the agricultural companies, this was a form of securing their access to capital in the form 
of equity instead of debt that would expose the companies to bank scrutiny. Many of the small 
shareholders  are  thus  former  property  claimants  who  did  not  succeed  in  their  effort  of 
monetary retribution of their property claims they were originally aiming to. The imposed 
shareholding as well as higher risk aversion then likely reflect in shareholders low interest in 
the farm future performance and thus investment activity. As the shareholders predominantly 
follow their interest of early reversal of their "investment" and payment of dividends, they do 
not rely on management to decide about investment activity, which may reduce the effect of 
internal information asymmetries and managerial discretion  on investment, especially then 
their effect on investment sensitivity to internal funds.  
Ownership concentration defines a situation in which investors decides to invest into higher 
shares and hence characterizes owners which likely have a higher entrepreneurial interest and 
more trust in the performance of the business. As these investors allocate more capital to the 
firm, they could also be assumed to be less risk averse than the small shareholders. The fact 
that they have more at stake is assumed to stimulate them to develop more efficient corporate 
governance structure, including better monitoring, controlling and incentive mechanism. In a 
similar vein, MAYER (1996: 11-12) argues: "Where there is concentrated ownership, there 
may be a greater willingness to discipline poorly performing management as well as more 
incentive to intervene and exercise 'voice' rather than 'exit'". If higher ownership shares also 
represent higher relative share in the legal capital per shareholders (i.e., there are less owners 
in  the  firm,  or  a  number  of  dominant  owners),  it  provides  the  shareholders  with  higher 
decision-making  powers  and  higher  returns  on  active  individual  owner's  governance. 
However, as ownership and control are separated, this ownership characteristics still leads to a 
higher investment activity than if ownership and control are concentrated in the same hands. 
Nevertheless, more efficient control of managers' performance reduces managers' transaction 
costs and leads to more optimal  investment decision than  in dispersed ownership. Due to 
lower managerial transaction costs and more effective control of the farm operation, farms 
with more concentrated ownership are also expected to achieve higher performance than less 
ownership concentrated firms. More optimal investment and higher economic performance 
means higher returns on capital and lesser reason for avoiding bank control of the investment 
projects.  Because  of  the  owners'  lower  risk  aversion,  and  better  management  monitoring, 
                                                 
3   Managerial transaction costs are costs  of  free  cash flow  dispersion, replacement resistance, resistance to 
profit  liquidation  or  merger,  power  struggles,  excessive  risk  taking,  excessive  diversification,    excessive 
growth, etc. 
4   DOMADENIK ET AL. (2008) do not refer in this context to the managers choices of avoiding bank scrutiny of 
investment  projects,  but  refer  to  less  liquid  capital  market  that  they  see  as  an  investment  constraint  in 
transition countries. 7 
 
higher ownership concentration is expected to lead to more optimal investment projects and a 
higher use of external financing, thus lower investment sensitivity to internal funds.  
The interest and concern divergence between external and internal owners can represent a 
source  of  investment  behavior  differences.  The  most  important  difference  between  the 
considerations of employed owners and external investors stems from the employed owners' 
linkage of firm performance to employment security. On the one hand, employment security 
stimulates higher labor performance, provides higher incentives to control over investment 
projects  and  monitor  management  performance;  on the  other  hand,  results  in  higher  risk-
aversion  towards  investment  projects.  DOW  (2003)  titled  this  behavior  as  "finance 
pessimism".  Another  problem  of  employee-owned  firms  closely  allied  with  investment 
behavior lies in what JENSEN AND MECKLING (1976) (see also FURUBOTN, 1976) term "the 
horizon problem". This implies that when workers leave the firm after the termination of their 
work contract they lose their share of the value of any capital that has been accumulated by 
the firm and thus have insufficient incentives in projects with long payback periods. As a 
result, employed owners prefer current consumption to investment (JONES ET AL. 2005) or 
investment projects with short payback period. This investment conservatism of employee 
ownership can be expected to result in lower and less than optimal investment level. Also, the 
higher risk aversion of employed owners could lead to preferring external financing due to 
banks revising the quality of the investment project, which would lead to lower investment 
sensitivity to generated cash flows than in firms with higher share of external owners. Higher 
external ownership, on the other hand, can be assumed to provide the farms with a lesser 
management scrutiny that allows for managerial discretion and thus managers to carry easier 
through their investment interests.   
METHOD OF INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 
Investment model 
Following MAIRESSE's et al. (1999) deliberation on the development of investment models and 
BOKUSHEVA's  et  al.  (2009)  discussion  on  investment  models'  suitability  for  the  case  of 
modeling investment behavior in transition agriculture, we chose to apply the error-correction 
accelerator model. This implies that we are not aiming to look for the "correct" investment 
model, but we select a model based on its theoretical specification and performance of the 
alternative  models  in  previous  applications.  The  advantage  of  the  error-correction 
specification of the accelerator model is that it allows to separate the long run investment 
determinants  from  the  short  run  investment  adjustments  and  its  quality  of  retaining 
information in the levels of output and capital stock (not only information in first differences). 
If data allow this specification then this characterization of investment behavior makes this 
model superior to other investment models applied to transition agriculture such as the basic 
accelerator model, adjustment cost or Euler equations. An alternative Tobin q model is less 
relevant for transition agriculture since the q (market) value of the corporate farms does not 
exist. Another advantage of the specification of the error-correction accelerator model is that 
it does not require any specification of adjustment cost. Due to spatial constraints on this 
paper, we describe the origin of error-correction accelerator model only briefly. See, e.g., 
MAIRESSE et al. (1999) for a more detailed description of this model. 
The error correction econometric approach was introduced into investment modeling by BEAN 
(1981).  The  error-correction  specification  of  the  investment  accelerator  model  nests  the 
demand  for  capital  equation,  it it it j y a k       (JORGENSON,  1963)  with  the  dynamic 
(accelerator) investment equation with an autoregressive-distributed lag of length two (ADL 
(2,2) function) In the equation for the firms’ desired capital stock, kit denotes the (natural) 
logarithm of the desired capital stock for firm i in period t, yit denotes the logarithm of output 8 
 
(or  sales)  and  jit  denotes  the  log  of  the  real  user  cost  of  capital.  In  the  error-correction 
accelerator model dynamic adjustment in capital,  it k  , is approximated by  1 , /  t i it K I , where Iit 
represents investment and Kit the capital stock for firm i at the end of period t. It also assumes 
that the variation in the user cost of capital, jit, can be controlled for by including year-specific 
and firm-specific effects. The error-correction model can be written as follows:  


























.   (1) 
The error correction coefficient,   ,  captures  the  long  run  investment  adjustment  to  the 
“desired level” of capital, dt is a time dummy, ηi is an unobserved firm-specific effect and vit is 
an error term (transitory shock). The remaining parameters capture the short run dynamics. 
The variable yi,t-2 is added to the error correction accelerator model to allow for a test of the 
assumption  of  constant  returns  to  scale  that  is  necessary  for  the  imposed  long-run 
proportionality in the model.  
Since the commonly used accelerator model was developed for sectors other than agriculture, 
we  need  to  consider  some  of  the  specifics  of  agriculture  for  the  intended  application. 
Characteristics, such as lower returns on capital, high sunk-costs of capital, and seasonality of 
production suggest possible investment conservatism and delays in adjustments of the desired 
stock of capital and slower responsiveness to market signals. Therefore, we also consider the 
error-correction  accelerator  model  to  nest  dynamic  investment  equation  with  an 
autoregressive-distributed  lag  of  length  three  (ADL  (3,3)  function).  The  resulting  error-
correction model has then the following form: 
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1 , .       (2) 
Similarly to numerous investment studies, we further add current and lagged cash flow scaled 
by  the  previous  period’s  value  of  fixed  capital  to  the  right-hand  side  of  the  investment 
equation to test the investment effect of these financial variables. This extension is analog for 
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1 , .  (3) 
In this error-correction specification of the accelerator model, we can test whether the cash 
flow (profit rate) plays the role of a long run determinant of investment, or whether it is only a 
short-run variable which can be interpreted as reflecting the transitory availability of funds for 
investment purposes. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the significance of investment effect 
of the cash flow variable is yet ambiguous. It can reflect the presence of financial  constraints 
on investment due to asymmetric information between investors and the firm  (e.g., FAZZARI, 
HUBBARD and PETERSEN, 1988), however, in the presence of adjustment costs, the level of 
cash flow to capital could contribute to the information on future profit or output expectations 9 
 
(NICKELL,  1978)  or  investment  opportunities  that  were  not  otherwise  accounted  by  such 
things as sales growth (SAMUEL, 1996). Also, as discussed in the theoretical section, in the 
presence of agency costs arising from the divergent goals between managers and owners, the γ 
parameters could capture managers' strategy towards the use of available internal funds for 
investment projects. Therefore, analyzing the investment behavior in the context of the firm 
specific ownership structure and related financial conditions will allow to shed more light on 
the sources of the investment sensitivity to cash flow. 
The theoretical predictions of firm and particularly ownership-specific adjustments in capital 
stock and differences in responses to various shocks, including availability of internal funds 
directs  the  next  extension  of  the  investment  model.  Long-run  panel  models  with 
heterogeneous  dynamics  were  estimated  in  previous  studies.  For  example,  Pesaran  et  al. 
(1999) specified a co-integrating long-run developments for various economies (countries), 
but allowed varying unit-specific short-run dynamics. In the context of investment behavior 
modeling, Bokusheva et al. (2009) allowed both short-run as well as long-run dynamics to 
vary across observations, concretely farms. We will follow this later approach and will allow 
investment  behavior  to  vary  across  four  ownership  variables  (Zn,  n  =  1,  ...,  N;  N  =  3)  - 
ownership concentration (Z1), external ownership (Z2), and owners' number (Z3). This yields 
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A more detailed description of the variables and their data sources follows in the next section. 
Data and variables  
Data on farm investment, production, capital and financial variables originate from the official 
balance sheets, income statements and supplementary forms of the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network of the Czech Republic (FADN CZ) survey for the years 1997-2007. Data on farm 
ownership structure comes from a structured data collection in the Czech Republic in 2004. 
This data survey was organized and funded by the Institute for Agricultural Development in 
Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), Halle, Germany, jointly with the Research Institute for 
Agricultural  Economics  (VUZE),  Prague,  Czech  Republic.  The  sample  contains  117 
agricultural companies with combined crop and animal production of a  legal entity status 
(cooperatives, JSC and LLC) for a minimum of 7 years of consecutive annual data between 
1997-2008; from these, data on 41 farms are available for the entire period of 11 years.  
The  empirical  model  variables  are  all  expressed  in  real  values  and  contain  following 
information: 
K    -  farm  stock of  capital;  it  includes  all  long-term  tangible,  intangible  and  financial 
assets; k denotes natural logarithm of K; 10 
 
I     - value of gross investment between  sequential  periods calculated as the change  in 
capital stock (representing net investment) plus depreciation and amortization; 
y    - logarithm of farm total sales; yi is the change in yi between two following periods;  
CF  -  value  of  the  farm’s  cash  flow  that  is  available  at  the  end  of  a  given  period  for 
purchasing new capital stock at the beginning of a following period; the cash flow 
indicator is unavailable in the double-entry accounting, therefore, it is calculated as 
retained earnings (profit or loss) plus depreciation and amortization; 
Zn     - n-vector of ownership variables (n = 3) that are time-invariant as data on ownership 
structure are available only for the year 2003. These variables are defined as dummy 
variables taking the value of 1 for values larger or equal to median, 0 otherwise. First 
ownership variable, Z1, denotes an average (per owner) share in farm's equity, shortly 
ownership concentration. Z2 represents external ownership,  i.e. a share of external 
investors to the total number of owners. Z3 denotes the number of owners number.  
5 
TD   - farm transformation indebtedness towards eligible persons to assets from restitutions 
and asset transformation (in the case of former collective farms). This dummy variable 
will be used purely as a control variable, i.e. variable controlling for possibly related 
variability in asset valuation (degree of capital depreciation) and credit constraints. It 
is incorporated in the model in the same way Z-variables are.     
dt    - time dummy variables that are included to account for time-specific shocks common 
to all farms.     
Estimation method 
The above specified model characterizes a dynamic process in which the dependent variable, 
current investment to capital ratio, is influenced by its past levels. Besides the autoregressive-
distributed lag, the investment model includes explanatory variables that cannot be considered 
strictly exogenous. The lagged investment to capital ratio can be assumed to be correlated 
with firm-specific effects. Also, growth in output (sale) may be correlated with these effects, 
and the current change in output (sale) is likely to be correlated with shocks to investment via 
the production function (Bond, et al. 2003). In this case a pure occurrence of firm-specific 
(unobserved) effects, correlated or uncorrelated with other variables on the right-hand side of 
estimated  equation,  requires  more  than  traditional  data  within-firm  transformation  or  first 
differentiation, which can be applied in the case of simpler panel model specifications. The 
reason for this is that estimates on such transformed data are not consistent on short time 
series (e.g., Mairesse a kol., 1999; Roodman 2009a). Most advanced method of solving this 
econometric  issue  is the  fully efficient  Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). For the 
estimation  of  empirical  models  with  autocorrelation  and  other  possible  endogeneities  in 
explanatory variables, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest a use 
of  system  GMM,  which  allows  a  combination  of  two  equations  and  two  samples  of 
instrumental variables on transformed and untransformed data, which can be more efficient 
                                                 
5   Ownership variables are generally assumed to be endogeneous to the performance and the market value of 
the firm, which again should stimulate investments and therefore this endogeneity should be controlled for in 
the model. These theories are generally applied to firms traded on the stock exchange or firms in mature 
economies with full property rights legal enforcement, develop capital market and investors culture. The 
corporate  ownership  structure  in  the  Czech  agriculture  is  mainly  a  result  of  the  transformation  and 
privatization  process  dominated  by  former  management  and  new  owners'  restructuring  objectives  and 
strategies.  Due  to  the  still  underdeveloped  capital  market  and  assumed  managerial  discretion,  little 
(particularly efficiency-driven) dynamics in the ownership structure and thus dismissible endogeneity in the 
ownership variables is assumed. 11 
 
than first-difference GMM
6. Because of the relatively large number of instruments compared 
to the number of observation, we estimate one-step system GMM. We apply the programming 
package provided by Roodman (2009a) designed for statistical software STATA.  
RESULTS 
Table  1  presents  parameter  estimates  of  the  error-correction  accelerator  model  without 
ownership  variables  derived  from  a  dynamic  investment  equation  with  an  autoregressive-
distributed  lag  of  length  two  (ADL  (2,2))  and  three  (ADL  (3,3))  (see  equation  3). 
A comparison of the estimates of these two models shows that accounting  for ADL (3,3) 
dynamics improves the model significantly. The test of the presence of the lag three effect 
(test  of  the  joint  significance  of  ρ1,  θ2,  and  γ2)  reveals  that  these  parameters  are  jointly 
significant at 5 % significance level, i.e., they contribute highly significant information to the 
model. Therefore, we further interpret Model 2 only.  
Table 1: GMM estimates of the error-correction accelerator investment model for Czech 
cooperative and corporate farms in 1997-2007  
Dependent variable 
It/Kt-1 
Model 1 - Basic AR(3, 3) error 
correction model
 (s = 2) 
Model 2 - AR(3, 3) error 
correction model (s = 3) 
Indep. var.  Coef.  Coef. estimate  P-value  Coef. estimate  P-value 
Constant  α0  0.110  0.156  0.258  0.065 
It-1/Kt-2  ρ0  -0.142  0.077  -0.323  0.022 
It-2/Kt-3  ρ1  -  -  -0.199  0.013 
∆yt   θ0  0.062  0.195  0.134  0.040 
∆yt-1  θ1  0.029  0.545  0.108  0.061 
∆yt-2  θ2  -  -  0.102  0.112 
kt-s - yt-s  ϕ0  -0.053  0.001  -0.065  0.011 
yt-s  φ0  -0.004  0.560  -0.013  0.212 
CFt/Kt-1  γ0  0.280  0.073  0.208  0.000 
CFt-1/Kt-2  γ1  0.232  0.002  0.300  0.001 
CFt-2/Kt-3  γ2  -  -  0.098  0.447 
# of obs.  850  689 
Overall fit (F-test)  12.52  0.000  11.02  0.000 
AR(2) test   -0.89  0.371  -0.94  0.348 
Hansen test  93.58  0.522  88.80  0.312 
Note:  Coefficients for time dummies are not included in the table. 
1)Instruments used: a) for first differences 
equation - lags 1 to 3 (2 to 3) of It-1/Kt-2, ∆yt, and CFt/Kt-1 in Model 1 (in Model 2); b) for level equation - all 
remaining  explanatory  variables  (untransformed)  included  in the  equation including time  dummies and  first 
differences of lags 2 of It-1/Kt-2 , ∆yt, and CFt/Kt-1. The estimates of lagged dependent variables are found in the 
range between their OLS estimates and within group (fixed effect) estimates, which is an indication of good 
estimates (see BOND, 2002).
 
The first two parameters following the constant refer to the short run effect of the past growth 
in capital stock on the current investment activity. Similarly to the study by BOKUSHEVA et al. 
(2009) for Russian  farms, this effect  is  found  significant negative,  however,  in the range 
between -1 and 0, which implies a cyclical development of investment activity oscillating 
around and approximating to zero over time. The cyclicity in investment activity can be well 
                                                 
6  In  the  literature,  the  "first-differenced"  GMM  proposed  by  Arrelano  and  Bond  (1991)  is  also  called 
Difference GMM. Both titles are refer to the estimation procedure using first-differences of the data in order 
to eliminate the fixed effects. System GMM augments Difference GMM by estimating simultaneously in 
differences  and  levels;  each  equation  being  distinctly  instrumented  (Roodman,  2009b).  Advantage  of 
applying system GMM also is that it allows to include time-invariant regressors, in our case ownership 
variables, that would disappear in first difference GMM (Roodman, 2006: 31).  12 
 
explained by capital market constraints in transition agriculture and relative dependency on 
internally generated funds that need to be accumulated over few years for larger investments. 
The decreasing tendency in the lumpiness of investment over time could refer to improving 
credit market conditions or bettering performance of the farms due to structural adjustments. 
The following three parameters capture the transitory investment effects of the past growth in 
output (sales), ∆yt,  ∆yt-1, ∆yt-2. The strongest positive investment response to changes in sales 
(to increasing or diminishing market opportunities) is the response to the most intermediate 
changes; it slightly weakens with the time distance of the sale changes.  
The next variable is the error correction term introducing the long-run investment adjustment 
to  the  optimal  capital  level.  Under  the  assumption  of  optimal  investment  behavior,  the 
coefficient   is expected to be negative, since the actual capital level lower than its “desired 
level” should be followed by higher future investment and conversely (see, e.g., BOND et al., 
1997: 5). This behavior is confirmed by the highly significant negative coefficient estimate. 
Farm investment activity is thus in congruence with the long-run efficient adjustment to the 
"desired" future level of capital, however, the size of adjustment is unexpectedly low.  The 
parameter suggest 7% approximation rate in capital stock to long run capital optimum over 
the analyzed period
7. Such low capital adjustment rate was also found by  BOKUSHEVA et al. 
(2009)  for  Russian  farms.  This  could  imply  high  capital  adjustment  costs  in  transition 
agriculture  or  transition-specific  capital  valuation  errors  embedded  in  the  data  (e.g., 
discrepancies between capital depreciation and use in production that vary across farms).   
The three γ parameters embody investment sensitivity to the level of generated internal funds 
or signals on future profitability. They imply relatively high investment sensitivity to cash 
flow to capital ratio, however, the sensitivity weakens with the lag of the financial variable. 
The test of their joint significance also imply that they do not capture only the transitory effect 
of  financial  constraints  on  farm  investment.  The  cash  flow  level  could  translate  into  an 
expectation of future profits and the significant parameter then imply an investment reaction 
to this expectation. In the context of transition agriculture, it is still reasonable to expect that 
the γ parameters capture, at least to a degree, persistent financial constraints but possibly also 
farms' cautious behavior towards bank credits due to unsettled property rights to agricultural 
assets and due to a fear of bankruptcy in the case of investment project failure in volatile 
market conditions.  
The last parameter to be discussed is the parameter with respect to the scale factor, yt-2. Its 
value not significantly different zero implies that the long run elasticity of capital to sales is 
unity. The production function is thus characterized by constant returns to scale which is a 
production function characteristic that is consistent with the theoretical assumptions of the 
investment accelerator model.  
Before presenting and interpreting the ownership variable effect in the framework of the error-
correction  model,  Table  2  provides  mean  statistics  of  investment,  ownership  and  other 
variables for farm groups build based on the three ownership characteristics of our interest. P-
values  from  the  t  test  indicate,  in  which  variables  the  farm  groups  of  distinct  ownership 
characteristics differ significantly. Investment activity level given by the ratio  It/Kt differs 
significantly only between farms with lower and higher number of owners. Farms with lower 
number of owners display a significantly higher investment activity than farms with higher 
number of owners. They are also assigned by higher sales to capital ratio and higher cash flow 
to capital ratio. This could imply that the higher investment activity could be related to the 
number of owners directly, but it could also imply that farms with lower number of owners 
                                                 
7   For industries in mature market economies, Mairesse et al. (1999) find the capital stock error correction to be 
of a value between 20 to 35%. 13 
 
perform better and the higher returns to capital stimulate higher investment rate or both. In 
line  with  our  theoretical  discussion,  the  lower  investment  activity  of  farms  with  higher 
number of owners could suggest their lower interest in the farm future performance, since for 
many  of  these  owners  becoming  shareholders  represented  the  only  alternative  to  losing 
ownership claims (or their significant value). 
The two groups of farms with different share of external ownership vary significantly in sales 
to capital and cash flow to capital ratios. The higher performance indicators related to lower 
share of external owners in the total number of owners does not seem to have an impact on 
investment activity. The higher performance could in this case also relate to the significant 
differences between these two groups in the number of owners.  
Table 2: Mean statistics comparison and two-sample t-test for farm ownership groups  




2)  Owners’ number 
  < median  ≥ median  p-value*  < median  ≥ median  p-value*  < median  ≥ median  p-value* 
It/Kt  0.121  0.135  0.143  0.128  0.128  0.947  0.137  0.119  0.059 
St/Kt  0.991  0.935  0.035  0.980  0.906  0.012  1.021  0.896  0.000 
It/St  0.112  0.142  0.024  0.131  0.127  0.825  0.126  0.130  0.754 
CFt/Kt-1  0.143  0.171  0.001  0.168  0.136  0.001  0.180  0.133  0.000 
∆St/Kt-1  -0.004  0.012  0.091  0.003  0.009  0.595  0.004  0.006  0.829 
Owners’ nr.  402  234  0.000  188  501  0.000  85  555  - 
Ext. own.
 2)  0.794  0.705  0.000  0.605  0.894  -  0.652  0.839  0.000 
Transf. debt
3)   0.385  0.203  0.000  0.378  0.179  0.000  0.439  0.142  0.000 
Cap. con. I
1)  -17  900  -  606  113  0.000  753  149  0.000 
Cap. con. II
4)  76  166  0.000  134  116  0.000  111  126  0.001 
Note: * P-value for a two-sample t-test; 
1) per owners share in equity (in thousands CZK); 
2) share of the number 
of external owners/investors in total number of owners (in thousands CZK);
 3) indebtedness rate from ownership 
transformation (debts toward eligible persons from transformation in value of total assets); 
4) per owner share in 
legal capital.     
The comparison of farm groups based on capital concentration reveals an important capital 
structure characteristic that might have a considerable impact on the investment modeling 
results.  Based  on  the  theoretical  predictions,  it  is  expected  that  higher  ownership 
concentration would be related to more optimal investment activity. In transition agriculture 
that  is  generally  assigned  by  underinvestment  and  credit  constraints,  higher  investment 
activity is expected to be more optimal. The difference in the investment to capital ratio is, 
however, insignificant. Moreover, the sales to capital ratio is higher for the group of farms 
with lower per owner share in equity. The investment to sales and cash flow to capital ratios, 
on the other hand, confirm the predicted effect of ownership concentration on  investment 
activity. These results are possible if there are systemic differences in capital value (capital 
depreciation) between farms with higher and lower capital concentration, i.e. lower capital 
value in group of farms with lower capital concentration increases the investment to capital 
ratio. The capital depreciation differences between farms are generally assumed to be depicted 
by the unobserved firm-specific effect term ηi in the investment model. In our case, however, 
this will be captured also in the capital concentration variable and all its cross terms. The most 
significant effect can be expected in the parameter of the capital concentration specific error-
correction term. This is due to the fact that farms with higher ownership concentration could 
be found with less optimal capital adjustment to long run capital stock optimum, possibly 14 
 
even overinvestment, due to their higher investment activity but significantly lower sales to 
capital ratio which determines the long run optimum.          
The advantage of the investment model analysis that follows is the simultaneous consideration 
of all three ownership variables, which allows to depict the investment effect of each of the 
ownership  variables while controlling   for the effects of the remaining  variables. Table 2 
presents  parameter  estimates  of  the  error-correction  models  with  ownership-specific 
variability in investment behavior. Model 3 in the table is the most parsimonious version8 of 
the model as defined in equation 4. In Model 4, we, in addition, control for the investment 
effect of transformation indebtedness, which is found to improve the overall fit of the model. 
Therefore, we further interpret the estimates of this model. 
The  estimates  of  the  capital  concentration-specific  variability  in  the  investment  model 
parameters  disclose  that  higher  ownership  concentration  increases  the  cyclical  investment 
activity response to past growth in capital stock. Farms with higher per owner shares in equity 
(capital concentration) respond less to changes in sales and their investment activity is less 
sensitive  to  internally  generated  funds  in  the  year  of  investment.  On  the  other  hand, 
investment activity of farms with higher capital concentration is more sensitive to past cash 
flow to capital ratio, which could imply their higher responsiveness to future profit signals. 
On the whole, the higher investment lumpiness, lower investment sensitivity to current cash 
flow and sales signals, as well as higher investment sensitivity to past cash flow point out to 
higher  ownership  concentration  being  related  to  higher  credit  financing  of  investment 
projects
9 that is conditioned on past profitability, lowers dependency of investment of current 
profits and can cause spikes in investment. These results suggest that managers of farms with 
higher ownership concentration   perform better and have lesser reasons to  avoid external  
scrutiny to gain access to financing.  Higher capital  ownership  concentration  can thus be 
considered as an element of a more efficient governance structure.     
The last significant parameter  in this group of farms  implies capital concentration-specific 
long run capital stock adjustment to capital  optimum. This parameter suggests that capital 
concentration increases the value of this parameter to  an extent that observed investment in 
this group of farms could be considered to exceed the long run optimum capital level. As 
discussed above, however, there are significant differences between the groups of farms with 
lower and higher capital concentration in active capital valuation (depreciation), which results 
in relative overvaluation of capital in the group of farms with higher capital concentration and 
lower output to capital ratio (see discussion of Table 2). Therefore, this parameter needs to be 
interpreted with caution; its inclusion in the model, however, is important, as it filters out 
information on this significant ownership-specific variability and thus improves the estimates 
of the remaining parameters. 
The group of farms with h igher external ownership  shows significantly lower investment 
response to past changes in sales and significantly higher investment sensitivity to cash flow 
to capital ratio. Management of farms with higher share of external owners can have multiple 
reasons to use internal funds instead of seeking credit. Being less productive (smaller sales to 
capital  ratio)  and  less  profitable  (smaller  cash  flow  to  capital  ratio)  could   limit  their 
application success. A rejection of credit application after disclosing performance indicators 
to external scrutiny could provide signals to owners that would further discourage  them from 
                                                 
8   Due to the large number of parameters in the complete model, we aimed for the most parsimonious model. 
We step-wise eliminated all variables with p-value higher than 0.3. 
9   Our data confirm that group of farms with higher ownership concentration has significantly higher credit 
indebtedness (10.4% compared to 6.9% in the group of farms with lower ownership concentration). The gap 
in the credit indebtedness between the groups with higher and lower capital concentration has increased over 
the years.  15 
 
using internal funds for investment. Also given that external ownership was a form of settling 
transformation indebtedness after owners unsuccessful attempt to withdraw their ownership 
claims  from  the  company  or  cooperative,  being  able  to  finance  investment  projects  from 
generated  profits  instead  of  distributing  dividends  is  unanticipated.  This  set  of  arguments 
suggests less efficient governance structure and managers higher scope of discretion in farms 
with higher share of external owners. 
Table 3: GMM estimates of the error-correction accelerator investment model for Czech 
agricultural enterprises in 1997-2007  
Dependent variable 
It/Kt-1 
Model 3 - AR(3, 3) error 
correction model with ownership-
specific dynamics 
Model 4 - AR(3, 3) error 
correction model with ownership-
specific dynamics (incl. control 
variable TD) 
Indep. var.  Coef.  Coef. estimate  p-value  Coef. estimate  p-value 
Constant  α0  0.062  0.319  0.061  0.508 
It-1/Kt-2  ρ0  -0.513  0.007  -0.648  0.004 
∆yt   θ0   -  -   1.658  0.063 
∆yt-2  θ2  0.505  0.057  0.710  0.040 
kt-3 - yt-3  ϕ0  -0.165  0.009  -0.222  0.008 
CFt/Kt-1  γ0  0.683  0.020  0.870  0.022 
Z1 (cap. ownersh. conc.)  α01   -  -   -  -  
Z1 * It-2/Kt-3  ρ11  -0.569  0.004  -0.526  0.062 
Z1 * ∆yt  θ01  -0.325  0.138  -0.737  0.233 
Z1 * ∆yt-1  θ11  -0.416  0.104  -0.676  0.043 
Z1 * ∆yt-2  θ21  -0.571  0.238  -0.916  0.048 
Z1 * (kt-3 - yt-3)  ϕ01  0.231  0.020  0.312  0.016 
Z1 * CFt/Kt-1  γ01  -   -   -0.971  0.046 
Z1 * CFt-1/Kt-2  γ11  0.412  0.017  1.218  0.008 
Z2 (external ownership)  α02   -  -   -  -  
Z2 * ∆yt  θ02   -  -   -1.122  0.147 
Z2 * ∆yt-2  θ22  -0.555  0.061  -0.765  0.037 
Z2 * CFt/Kt-1  γ02  0.131  0.279  0.442  0.072 
Z3 (number of owners)  α03   -  -   -  -  
Z3 * It-1/Kt-2  ρ03  1.423  0.010  1.424  0.014 
Z3 * It-2/Kt-3  ρ13  0.740  0.033  0.809  0.069 
Z3 * ∆yt  θ03   -   -  -0.667  0.092 
Z3 * yt-2  φ03  -0.022  0.003  -0.027  0.014 
TD (transf. indebtedness)  α04   -   -  -1.380  0.212 
TD * ∆yt  θ04  -    -  -1.534  0.045 
TD * yt-2  φ04  -    -  0.133  0.202 
# of obs.  529  529 
Wald test (F-test)  4.25 (23)  0.000  2.70 (30)  0.000 
Wald test of joint significance*   2.13 (11)  0.026  2.34 (17)  0.005 
AR(2) test   -0.61  0.539  -0.61  0.539 
Hansen test  47.15  0.794  37.71  0.900 
Note:  Coefficients for time dummies are not included in the table. Instruments used: a) for first differences 
equation - lags 1 to 3 of It-1/Kt-2, lags 1 of ∆yt-2, and CFt-1/Kt-2 in both models; b) for level equation - constant, ∆yt,  
∆yt-1, kt-3 - yt-3, Zn, (plus TD) time dummies and first differences of lags 1 of It-1/Kt-2,  ∆yt-2, and CFt-1/Kt-2 in Model 
3 (Model 4). * Wald test of joint significance of ownership-specific investment variability.
 
The parameters on the investment effect of the third ownership variable imply that increasing 
number of owners reduces cyclical investment trend. This could relate to the larger size in 16 
 
capital stock of these farms and lower investment to capital ratio (see Table 2). Larger number 
of owners also reduces responsiveness to changes in sales. Due to the high correlation with 
the size of capital stock, we also find the scale parameter, φ03, to vary with the number of 
owners.  Within  the  group  of  farms  with  higher  number  of  owners,  the  returns  to  scale 
decrease with increasing size. Lower profitability and returns to capital indicators (Table 2) 
suggest that farms with highly dispersed ownership structure do not perform as well as farms 
with smaller number of owners.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical results from error-correction accelerator model estimated on Czech cooperative and 
corporate  farms  from  1997-2008  show  that  ownership  structure  significantly  affects  farm 
investment  behavior.  Farms  with  lower  number  of  owners  display  a  significantly  higher 
investment activity than farms with higher number of owners. Together with indication of 
higher  productivity  and  profitability,  lower  number  of  owners  could  be  considered  to 
contribute to efficiency of cooperative and corporate farms' governance. Group of farms with 
higher external ownership shows significantly higher investment sensitivity to cash flow to 
capital ratio, while being, at the same time, less productive and less profitable. Owners of 
farms with higher share of external ownership thus seem to be to a higher degree constrained 
in  their  control  over  management.  The  empirical  results  thus  are  in  line  with  theoretical 
expectation that external ownership provides with more scope for managerial discretion that 
can lead to less optimal investment decisions and overall performance, and thus higher agency 
costs. Results on the investment effect of ownership concentration, on the other hand, suggest 
its significant contribution to investment performance. Relaying to a higher degree on credit 
financing of investment projects, farms with higher per owner shares in farm equity display 
far  highest profitability  among considered groups of  farms. This observation supports the 
theoretical  expectation  that  higher  ownership  concentration  provides  incentives  to  more 
effective joint ownership governance.  
Despite their congruence with theoretical predictions, the empirical results could be affected 
by transition specifics of the farm structures and characteristics of equity shareholders. Small 
shareholder in farms with high number of owners are likely shareholders who despite their 
efforts did not succeed in financial settlement of their transformation claims, and for whom 
becoming shareholders represented the only alternative to losing ownership claims or their 
significant  value. This could result  in their  lower  interest  in the  farm  future performance 
reducing  farms'  investment activity. One could  also argue that the whole process of  farm 
transformation  was  subjected  to  former  managers'  discretion  and  the  resulting  ownership 
structure hence reflects their managerial abilities, possibly their ideologies, degree of social 
responsibility or preferences. Nevertheless, if nothing more, the empirical results deliver great 
insides that can suggest future developments of the Czech farm structure under competitive 
pressure. Depending on the strength of the competitive pressure, farms with highly dispersed 
ownership among large number of owners will require marked restructuring that might be 
possible after bankruptcy or gradual small shareholders buy-outs leading to higher ownership 
concentration. External owners will be required to implement tools of more efficient corporate 
governance, which is likely to be realized only with incentives from higher shares at stake. All 
results thus verge toward increasing future ownership concentration of today's cooperative and 
corporate farms. Developing institutions in support of the agricultural share market that would 
attract investors from outside the current farms could contribute to the speed and effectiveness 
of the farm ownership restructuring. 